## Consider the profile

| 29 | $A>B>C$ | 15 | $C>B>A$ |
| :---: | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 2 | $A>C>B$ | 26 | $B>C>A$ |
| 13 | $C>A>B$ | 1 | $B>A>C$ |

1. Calculate the rankings using plurality, plurality with runoff, the Borda Count, and pairwise elections.
2. Modify the profile by moving voters from one region to another so that the plurality, runoff, and Borda Count rankings stay the same, but now $B$ is the Condorcet winner.
3. Find all outcomes that are possible for this profile by using a weighted voting method.
4. For each outcome that you determined is possible, give a set of weights that determines this outcome.
