- No Problem Set this week
- My goal is to have Exam 3 ready by 11/23, due on 12/3 Know the end of semester will be weird with exam period remote after Thanksgiving
- Explicitly think about what your take-aways from Crypto this semester will be

In addition to content, think about the way of thinking / problem-solving and how it might apply to other academic pursuits and how you approach problems in general

In other words, how has Math 202 changed your life?

# Digital Signature Algorithm, 160-bit

#### Key creation - Alice

- Find 1024-bit prime p, 160-bit prime q where q divides p-1
- Find  $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$  where  $\mathrm{ord}(\alpha) = q$
- Choose private d where 0 < d < q Compute  $\beta \equiv \alpha^d \mod p$
- Publish  $(p, q, \alpha, \beta)$

#### Sign message x - Alice

- Choose ephemeral  $k_E$  where  $0 < k_E < q$
- Compute  $r \equiv (\alpha^{k_E} \mod p) \mod q$  $s \equiv (SHA(x) + dr) k_E^{-1} \mod q$
- Send (*x*, (*r*, *s*))

#### Verify signature - Bob

- Compute  $w \equiv s^{-1} \mod q$   $u_1 \equiv w \cdot SHA(x) \mod q$   $u_2 \equiv w \cdot r \mod q$  $v \equiv (\alpha^{u_1} \beta^{u_2} \mod p) \mod q$
- If v = r then valid If  $v \neq r$  then invalid

# Some shortcomings of digital signatures

- Every single message between Alice and Bob should be signed
- In particular, every 128-bit AES block should be signed
- Signatures are necessarily asymmetric (e.g. RSA, DSA) and less efficient than symmetric like AES
- Motivation for Message Authentication Codes, or MACs

### **Message Authentication Codes**

- Uses symmetric keys so faster in implementation
- Keys used for only that one session
- Based on hash functions or block ciphers, like AES
- · Assumes symmetric key has been securely exchanged
- Also called keyed hash functions

# Example: HMAC-SHA256, keyed-hash message authentication code

- Assume Alice and Bob have shared symmetric message key k
- For Alice to create MAC *m* for message *x*, concatenate *k* with *x* and hash:

m = SHA2-256(k||x)

Alice sends (*x*, *m*)

- Bob can verify *m* since they have shared message key *k*
- Provides
  - Integrity: Can determine if message modified
  - Authentication: Only Alice has shared message key k
- Does not provide non-repudiation

• Signal protocol (https://signal.org/docs/) has super-clever idea of using a *chain key* and "ratcheting" forward after each use.

#### Essentially,

- Hash (chain key ||0x01 ) to get message key for HMAC-SHA256 with message
- Hash (chain key with ||0x02) to get chain key to use with next message
- · If key compromised, cannot work backwards to use with previous messages
- Search for "WhatsApp Encryption Overview" for technical white paper
- Some strong arguments for using Signal rather than WhatsApp