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Math 398 - Game Theory - Reading Assignments
March 2000
Ok. Some of these are belated, but
you'll still probably want to print this page out and keep it in your text.
(Last modified:
Tuesday, March 14, 2000,
2:51 PM )
All numbers indicate sections from Games and Decision Making
by Aliprantis and Chakrabarti.
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For Thursday March 2
To read :
Section 3.3 Uncertainty and Single-Person Decisions
Be sure to understand :
Example 3.13, the statement of Bayes Theorem
For Tuesday March 7
To read :
Section 4.1 The Structure of Sequential Games
Section 4.2 Sequential Games with Perfect Information, through Example 4.11
Be sure to understand :
The defintions of an information set, perfect and imperfect information,
and a Nash equilibrium in a sequential game
For Thursday March 9
To read :
Examples 4.12 and 4.14 in Section 4.2 Sequential Games with Perfect Information
For Tuesday March 21
To read :
Section 4.3 Sequential Games with Imperfect Information
Be sure to understand :
Defintion of a subgame and a subgame perfect equilibrium
Examples 4.17 and 4.19
For Thursday March 23
To read :
Section 5.1 The Market for Lemons
Section 5.2 Beliefs and Strategies
Be sure to understand :
Examples 5.1 and 5.2
The definition of a belief system and a behavior profile
For Tuesday March 28
To read :
Section 5.3 Consistency of Beliefs
Section 5.4 Expected Payoff
Be sure to understand :
The defintion of a consistent strategy profile and belief system
Example 5.6
For Thursday March 30
To read :
Section 5.5 Sequential Equilibrium
Be sure to understand :
The definition of sequential equilibrium
Example 5.10
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