Math 398 - Game Theory - Reading Assignments
March 2000

Ok. Some of these are belated, but you'll still probably want to print this page out and keep it in your text.
(Last modified: Tuesday, March 14, 2000, 2:51 PM )

All numbers indicate sections from Games and Decision Making by Aliprantis and Chakrabarti.

For Thursday March 2

To read :
Section 3.3 Uncertainty and Single-Person Decisions

Be sure to understand :
Example 3.13, the statement of Bayes Theorem

For Tuesday March 7

To read :
Section 4.1 The Structure of Sequential Games
Section 4.2 Sequential Games with Perfect Information, through Example 4.11

Be sure to understand :
The defintions of an information set, perfect and imperfect information, and a Nash equilibrium in a sequential game

For Thursday March 9

To read :
Examples 4.12 and 4.14 in Section 4.2 Sequential Games with Perfect Information

For Tuesday March 21

To read :
Section 4.3 Sequential Games with Imperfect Information

Be sure to understand :
Defintion of a subgame and a subgame perfect equilibrium
Examples 4.17 and 4.19

For Thursday March 23

To read :
Section 5.1 The Market for Lemons
Section 5.2 Beliefs and Strategies

Be sure to understand :
Examples 5.1 and 5.2
The definition of a belief system and a behavior profile

For Tuesday March 28

To read :
Section 5.3 Consistency of Beliefs
Section 5.4 Expected Payoff

Be sure to understand :
The defintion of a consistent strategy profile and belief system
Example 5.6

For Thursday March 30

To read :
Section 5.5 Sequential Equilibrium

Be sure to understand :
The definition of sequential equilibrium
Example 5.10

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Last modified: Tuesday, March 14, 2000, 2:51 PM