#### **Announcements**

- Problem Set #5 due Wednesday
- Graded Exam 1 will be posted this afternoon Solutions posted as well
- · Next exam is in two weeks
- In "TR Announcements" forum, list of topics we'll fill in next semester
- FYI, Christof Paar's lectures for his course are on YouTube https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC1usFRN4LCMcfIV7UjHNuQg/videos

## Few points on RSA

- RSA encryption is deterministic: Given plaintext x and public key  $k_{pub} = (n, e)$ , the ciphertext y is always the same
- AES addresses this using IV and block chaining
- Can address in RSA with padding (cf. Section 7.7 of text)
  - Essentially adds random bits and a fixed string to plaintext before encrypting
  - Adds perturbation so that same plaintext will encrypt to different values
  - Can also provide check on errors in transmission when decrypting
- RSA keys are large
  Next semester we'll see elliptic curve public key encryption that has same security as RSA with much smaller keys

## Why hash functions?

- Message signed in RSA digital signature cannot be longer than Alice's modulus n
- Often want to sign *much* larger messages x (e.g. digital media)
- Solution is to sign the hash of x, h(x)
- Idea is that h(x) is much smaller than x

## From pg. 303 of text

#### **Properties of Hash Functions**

- 1. **Arbitrary message size** h(x) can be applied to messages x of any size.
- 2. Fixed output length h(x) produces a hash value z of fixed length.
- 3. **Efficiency** h(x) is relatively easy to compute.
- 4. **Preimage resistance** For a given output z, it is impossible to find any input x such that h(x) = z, i.e, h(x) is one-way.
- 5. Second preimage resistance Given  $x_1$ , and thus  $h(x_1)$ , it is computationally infeasible to find any  $x_2$  such that  $h(x_1) = h(x_2)$ .
- 6. **Collision resistance** It is computationally infeasible to find any pairs  $x_1 \neq x_2$  such that  $h(x_1) = h(x_2)$ .

# Downsides to using RSA for key exchange

Assume Alice generates AES key, uses Bob's public credentials to sign

- Alice has to assume Bob has been careful about keeping private key private
- Bob has to assume Alice generated random AES key
- Bob has to assume Alice hasn't used same AES key elsewhere

# Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

A trusted source publishes p and  $\alpha$  that Alice and Bob use e.g. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3526 Note [] represents the floor function

- Alice picks private a, sends Bob  $A = \alpha^a \mod p$
- Bob picks private b, sends Alice  $B = \alpha^b \mod p$
- Shared key is  $k_{AB} = A^b \equiv B^a \mod p$